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BUILDING RESTRICTIONS
CONTRACTS
OR SERVITUDES

-

ROBERT KRATOVIL*

INTRODUCTION

Before the universe was created, there was chaos. Then an
ordered universe sprang into being. In time, private restrictions
on land use began to appear. In 1926, zoning became valid,' and
chaos reappeared. For this author, the problems of chaos in the
law of zoning must await another day. Immediately at hand is
the chaos that continues to pervade the area of private land use
restrictions.
The columnist Westbrook Pegler characterized the twenties
as "the era of wonderful nonsense." This phrase is a particularly
apt characterization of the much earlier era of covenants run* J.D., De Paul University. The author is currently Professor at the John
Marshall Law School. In addition to his teaching responsibilities, Mr. Kratovil
has authored numerous legal articles as well as several textbooks in the area of
real property and mortgage law.
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Consider,
for example, the situation where a zoning ordinance forbids residential uses
in commercial and industrial zones, while an earlier recorded private deed
restriction permits only residential uses. See, e.g., Grubel v. MacLaughlin,
286 F. Supp. 24 (D. V.I. 1968); Key v. McCabe, 54 Cal. 3d 736, 8 Cal. Rptr. 425
(1960); 1.77 Acres of Land v. State, 241 A.2d 513 (Del. 1968); Blakely v. Gorin,
365 Mass. 590, 313 N.E.2d 903 (1976). Many decisions continue to announce
the doctrine that a city is powerless to adopt zoning that abrogates prior
private building restrictions. E.g., Ridge Park Home Owners v. Pena, 88 N.
M. 563, 544 P.2d 278 (1975); City of Gatesville v. Powell, 500 S.W.2d 581 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973). In stating the rule so broadly, courts tend to overlook the
fact that zoning has changed character recently. Early zoning ordinances
were non-exclusive. Thus, homes were permitted in industrial zones. Today's exclusive zoning ordinances forbid residential construction in industrial zones. People v. Morton Groves, 11Ill.2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959); Roney
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956); Lamb v. City
of Monroe, 358 Mich. 136, 99 N.W.2d 566 (1959). Where there is this confrontation between zoning and prior land restrictions, the zoning must prevail.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., supra, established the principle that
reasonable zoning prevails over prior property rights, including fee simple
titles. Obviously, the same principle is applicable to lesser property rights,
such as equitable servitudes created by a general plan of building restrictions. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.40 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). The literature is extensive. See, e.g., Berger, Conflict Between Zoning Ordinances
and Restrictive Convenants, 43 NE. L. REV. 449 (1964); Comment, Legal
and Policy Conflicts: Between Deed Covenants and Subsequently Enacted
Zoning Ordinances,24 VAND. L. REV. 1031 (1971); Comment, The Effect of
Private Restrictive Covenants on Exercise of the Public Powers of Zoning
and Eminent Domain, 1963 Wisc. L. REV. 321.

466

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11:465

ning with the land at law. An exceptionally revolting but highly
relevant exhibit is Wheeler v. Schad.2 Today when one observes,
in this context, that "in the beginning was the word," one usually means the word of Tulk v. Moxhay.3 Equity enters the
scene, and glimpses of a rational order of private land use restrictions begin to appear.
It would be too much to hope that Tulk's new concept of a
general plan of building restrictions enforceable in equity
against purchasers with notice would lead the profession out of
the thicket of conceptual riddles that antedated Tulk. 4 After all,
it is an article of faith in our profession that every rule deserves
its own pigeon hole. If the facts don't fit, that's too bad for the
facts. They must be pounded into the shape and size of some
pigeon hole. Jerome Frank liked to refer to this as the phonographic theory of the law. This theory is that all the law that
exists or ever will exist is on phonograph records, and a lawyer's
task is simply to find the right record. Under the rules, a lawyer
must wait until he is elected or appointed to the judiciary. Then
he gets to play the records. 5 The phonographic theory of the law
is exemplified in the law relating to the practice of a subdivider
using deeds to create restrictive covenants. From this detestable
practice come most of the conceptual problems of building restrictions. Why use deeds to create restrictions? That's the way
it's always been done. The law is on the phonograph records. It's
2. 7 Nev. 204 (1871) (where the parties neglected to insert the covenant
in their deed of conveyance and drew it up six days later after discovering
their oversight, the court held that it was unenforceable because at the time
of making the covenant, there was no "privity of estate" between the covenanter and the covenantee).
3. 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (1848) ("[tIhe question does not
depend upon whether the covenant runs with the land... ; for if an equity

is attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with notice of
that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from whom he
purchased").
4. See, e.g., Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Emigrant Indus.
Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 250, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1938). The confusion be-

tween enforcement at law and in equity is evident. This case exemplifies
the concern of some post- Tulk courts with the requirements of covenants
running with the land at law. In addressing the issue of whether plaintiff
could enforce a covenant, the court set out what it called the "age-old essentials of a real covenant:"
1. It must appear that grantor and grantee intended that the covenant should run with the land.
2. It must appear that the covenant is one "touching on" or "concerning" the land with which it runs;
3. It must appear that there is privitr of estate "between the promisee or party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it, and the promisor or party who rests under the burden of the
covenant."
Id. at 250.
5. J. FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 418 (1930).
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much easier than thinking. This practice opens up a Pandora's
box. The possibilities for mischief are endless. The subdivider
might insert the covenants in some deeds, but not in others. The
covenants might lack uniformity. The subdivider might tire of
trying to sell lots to individual buyers and, instead, sell all the
remaining lots to a third party by a deed containing no covenants. Again, if we treat the general plan as being created by
who bought when
uniform deeds, how fares the first purchaser,
6
there was only one deed, namely his deed?
To begin, there are at least two theories as to the nature of
enforcement rights where a general plan of private building restrictions exists. In one view, the restrictive coveant is nothing
but a contract, relating to the use of land, and equity is merely
granting specific performance of that contract. In the other view,
the general plan creates equitable servitudes, similar to easements, and these are interests in the land itself. In comparing
the two theories, the soundness of the equitable servitudes theory becomes apparent. Let us begin by looking at a number of
the problems created by the contracts theory.
THE CONTRACTs THEORY
Recording Problems
If the restrictive covenant is a mere contract, it may not be
entitled to recording. 7 A right that is not entitled to recording is
a precarious right, since all agree that restrictive covenants can
only be enforced against those who acquire their land with notice of the restrictive covenant. 8 Therefore, if the contract cannot
be recorded, the purchaser of that property will not have received adequate notice and the contractual right will not be enforceable.
Suppose, however, we regard this particular right as more
than a mere contract right. It could be regarded as a contract
with the first purchaser to create equitable servitudes good
6. Many of the conceptual difficulties which arise in the field of private
restrictions on land use are discussed in other texts and articles and therefore need not be discussed at length here. See, e.g., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY §§ 9.24-9.40 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952); Reno, The Enforcement ofEquitable Servitudes in Land (pts. 1-2), 28 VA. L. REV. 951, 1067 (1942).
7. Most recording laws are of ancient vintage. Often they speak of
"conveyances" as being the only recordable documents. E.g., MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 183, § 4 (1973). Of course, the courts have turned handsprings
to broaden this archaic expression. The results have been uneven. See, e.g,
66 AM. JuR. 2d Record and RecordingLaws §§ 54, 105, 123 (1973); 6 PowELL
REAL PROPERTY § 914 (1977).
8. Indeed, the philosophy of Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep.
1143 (1848), is that a person who takes with notice of a restriction cannot in
equity and good conscience be permitted to violate that' restriction.
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against all lot purchasers and thus, all restrictions would become entitled to recording, just as a contract for the sale of land
is entitled to recording in most states. It would be treated as a
"conveyance." This is a sneaky way of creeping into the other
guy's pigeon hole.
Implied Assignment Theory
But if these restrictive covenants are basically contracts,
and conceding, for the sake of argument that each original
grantee from the subdivider automatically acquires a right of
specific performance, what about the grantee of the first purchaser? What about later purchasers? How do the contract benefits of the restrictive covenant pass from one landowner to
another? Another concept must be invented. Under this concept,
each deed is regarded as an implied assignment of the contract
rights of the grantor.9 The doctrine that contract rights are capable of implied assignment with the benefited land is an innovation.' 0 In addition it is certainly an oddity. An assignment of a
chose in action transfers an in personam right to bring an action
at law. By the contract theory, an implied assignment by deed
transfers a right to sue in equity to enjoin a breach of the restrictive covenant. We are definitely now in the midst of a bit of
a puzzle.
Pursuing the implied assignment theory we encounter other
problems. There are decisions, all questionable, holding that an
assignee of a contract cannot obtain specific performance unless, by the assignment, he personally assumes all obligations of
his assignor. Absent this, the party with whom the assignor originally contracted would not have the same rights against the assignee as he had against the assignor; mutuality of remedy
therefore, would be lacking." Of course, the notion that mutualVA.

9. Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land (pt. 2), 28
L. REV. 1067, 1068 (1942). Under the contract theory, the rights of the

promisee are said to be impliedly assigned along with the transfer of the

benefited land.

10. Id. Professor Reno states that it is an innovation that should not be
extended in the absence of evidence of such an intention on the part of the
parties to the contract.
11. E.g., Lunt v. Lorseheider, 285 Ill. 589, 121 N.E. 237, 239 (1918) (where
assignees of an executory contract for the sale of property did not assume
any of the obligations of such contract, they were not bound to perform, and
consequently could not bring suit for specific performance against the original parties to the contract for exchange). Cf. Lewis v. McCreedy, 378 Ill. 264,

38 N.E.2d 170 (1941) (assignee of the purchaser's interest in a contract for

sale of realty would not be denied specific performance of the contract on

the grounds that she had not assumed all of the obligations of the original

contract and hence, a lack of mutuality where the assignee made a tender of

the full amount due upon the contract during the time the contract was effective between the original parties).
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ity of remedy must be present is dying. But it is entitled to a
passing glance before final interment.
In contract theory, an assignee who claims the benefit of an
assignment ought to be able to establish that, at the time of the
assignment, he had knowledge of the benefits of the implied assignment. 12 Is the grantee in a deed of restricted land truly
aware that he is an implied assignee? Certainly doubts exist.
Under the contract theory, doubts inevitably arise as to the
identity of those who are to be regarded as implied assignees of
the benefit of the restrictive covenant. A grantee in a deed offers
no great problem, assuming he acquired title with knowledge of
the assignment implied in the deed. But how about a party having an interest less than the fee simple title, such as a sublessee? The doctrine of implied assignment of contract rights is
apparently limited to transfers by the covenantee of an estate
sufficient to create privity of estate. Thus, the sublessee of a covenantee can acquire no rights in his sublessor's covenants. 13 No
solution to this problem has been suggested.
Other Conceptual Problems
There is also the problem of how the burden of the contract
is fastened upon subsequent purchasers of lots in the restricted
subdivision. In contract theory, rights are assignable. Liabilities
are not assignable. There is a minority view that an assignee
acquires, along with the rights assigned, the liabilities of the
assignor. 14 Oddly, this view is never mentioned in the contract
theory cases, possibly because it relates basically to in
personam liability rather than in rem liability.
Then there is the problem of the Statute of Frauds. Looking
at the benefits side of the contract and treating the early deeds
as contracts to impose equitable servitudes does not escape the
requirement that contracts creating an interest in land and contracts not enforceable within a year must be evidenced by a
memorandum in writing signed by the party sought to be
charged. Plainly, such a memorandum is never present in the
12. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.29 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Reno,
The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land (pt. 2), 28 VA. L. REV.
1067, 1077 (1942).
13. Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land (pt. 2), 28
VA. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (1942). Since the sublease cannot pass privity of estate

to the subtenant, the implied assignment of contract rights would stop with
the sublessor.
14. See, e.g., Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 194 S.E.2d 521
(1973) (assignee under a general assignment of an executory, bilateral contract, in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, becomes the delegatee of his assignor's duties and impliedly promises his
assignor that he will perform such duties).
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restrictive covenant cases. The doctrine of part performance as
taking a case out of the statute can be stretched to include acts
done in reliance on oral agreements to impose uniform restrictive covenants where refusal to enforce will lead to irreparable
injury.' 5 The conceptual Leaning Tower of Pisa is now acquiring
a truly dangerous list. Never mind. More is coming.
Looking again at the burden side of the restrictive covenant,
we find no memorandum signed by the party to be charged, the
grantees in the deeds containing the restrictive covenants. The
contract theory resorts to another real property exception. Acceptance of the deed can be regarded as a promise by the
grantee to be bound by the covenants. 16 The acceptance of the
deed by the grantee amounts to an adoption of the signature of
the grantor as that of the grantee! 17 True, this is another exception under the Statute of Frauds. But by this time the contract
theory has been so riddled with real property exceptions that it
is hardly recognizable as a contract theory. One more exception
will do no great harm.
There remains the question of identifying the parties bound
by the restrictive covenant under the contract theory. This is
solved by implying a duty against the community not to interfere with performance of the contract. "It is the breach of this
duty, by acquiring possession of the land with notice and thereafter doing or omitting something contrary to the agreement,
that creates a secondary right in personam against the possessor of the land."' 8 If you are getting the feeling that all this is a
mare's nest of conceptual nonsense, you could be right.
Under the contract theory, it has been held that even if the
character of the neighborhood has so changed that equity will
decline to enforce the restrictive covenant by injunction, there is
a residual contract personal liability resting on each lot owner
that renders title unmarketable. 19 There is simply no end to the
15. Some states have extended the doctrine of part performance this
far. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.25 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952)16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land (pt. 1), 28
VA. L. REV. 951, 974 (1942).
19. Bull v. Burton, 227 N.Y. 101, 124 N.E. 111 (1919). The Bull court dealt
with the question of whether the restrictions included in a deed to a predecessor in title of the seller of property constituted an encumbrance which
would justify the purchaser's refusal to carry out the contract to purchase.
The court found that the restriction constituted an encumbrance and that
since the purchaser would be subject to an action at law for damages if he
violated the encumbrance, it would not compel specific performance. Elsewhere courts will not enforce restrictions on land use after their purpose
has been achieved. E.g., Independent Congregational Soc'y v. Davenport,

381 A.2d 1137 (Me. 1978); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1111 (1949) (where enforcement
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nonsense that courts can invent. Also, it should not be forgotten
that the advocates of this view selected it as against the equitable servitudes doctrine that regards the restrictive covenant as
creating an interest in land.
EQUrrABLE SERVITUDES THEORY

In General
The contracts-specific performance theory of restrictive covenants, the minority view just discussed, has some
distinguished supporters. 20 In contrast, the majority view is that
a general plan of building restrictions creates equitable servitudes in the nature of easements, the benefit and burden running with each restricted lot as naturally as easements
appurtenant run with the land. Indeed, equitable servitudes
have been analogized to easements. 2 1 Likewise the equitable
servitudes theory has formidable advocates. 22 As will be seen,
the equitable servitudes theory is simple and practical. The doctrine of equitable servitudes is one that the courts themselves
have molded from typical considerations of fairness and justice.23 By using this doctrine, virtually all the pitfalls of the contracts theory can be avoided.
Creation of restrictions by a plat of the subdivision is the
simplest form of implementing the equitable servitudes theory.
The scheme of restrictions is included in the recorded plat of the
subdivision. The entire scheme of restrictions appears on the
plat, usually preceded by some phrase such as: "All lots, parts of
lots, or other areas included in this subdivision are subject to
the following restrictions."
This method has the obvious effect of explicitly creating a
general plan. That notion is clearly expressed. It cannot be miswould be pointless). The rule for covenants is the same as the rule regarding conditions. Barnett v. County of Washoe, 86 Nev. 730, 476 P.2d 8 (1970).

Restrictions are limited in duration despite language like "forever." Ferguson v. Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church, 200 Okla. 41, 190 P.2d 1019 (1948);

Edney v. Powers, 224 N.C. 441, 31 S.E.2d 372 (1944); Comment, Duration of
Restrictive Covenants, 1 DRAKE L. REV. 14 (1951).
20. Ames, Specific Performancefor and Against Strangers to the Contrac4 17 HARV. L. REV. 174 (1904); Giddings, Restrictions upon the Use of

Land, 5 HARv. L. REV. 274 (1892); Stone, Equitable Rights and Liabilitiesof

Strangers to a Contract (pt. 2) 19 COLUM. L. REV. 177 (1919); Stone, Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangersto the Contract (pt. 1), 18 COLUM. L.

REV. 291 (1918).
21. See cases cited in 26 CJ.S. Deeds § 167 at 1141 n.97 (1956).

22.

C. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING wrrH THE LAND 174

(2d ed 1947); Pound, The Progressof the Law 1918-1919, 33 HARv. L. REV. 813
(1919).
23. BEUSCHER, WRIGHT & GITELMAN, LAND USE 138 (1976).
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understood. The reference to "other areas" includes streets that
might later be vacated. Also, the plat has a double operation.
Since it covers the entire subdivision, it is apparent that the
plan of restrictions is a general plan. 24 Since the plat is a recordable instrument, it imparts constructive notice of the restrictions to all persons subsequently acquiring an interest in the
platted land.25 Every deed describing a lot as falling in a recorded plat automatically incorporates the plat by reference.
This is simple hornbook law.
General Plan-Declarationof Restrictions
All the lettering on a subdivision plat is done by the surveyor who surveyed the land. However, where a scheme of restrictions is lengthy, as is a common occurrence, it is impractical
to put all this lettering on the face of the plat. Rather, the plat
bears a legend to the effect that all the land in the subdivision is
subject to restrictions set forth in a "Declaration of Restrictions
recorded contemporaneously herewith." The declaration of
restrictionsis typed, identified as the Declaration to which the
plat refers, signed and acknowledged by the landowner, and
handed to the recorder's filing clerk simultaneously with the
plat. The validity of this arrangement rests on the universally
accepted recording rule that one recorded instrument may refer
to and incorporate by reference another instrument recorded in
26
the same office.
Careful lawyers, nevertheless, include in the subdivider's
first deed of each lot a lengthy clause referring to and incorpo24. E.g., Case v. Morisette, 475 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court

noted two prerequisites for equitable enforcement of property servitudes.
First, the servitude must be engrafted on one parcel of land with the purpose of benefiting one or more other parcels. Second, there must be notice
of the servitude to the party against whom enforcement is sought at the
time he took the burdened property. In this case, the court found the requisite notice in the description contained in defendant's deed that referred to
the lot as a parking area as shown on the revised plat recorded with a declaration of covenants. Thus, the defendant had constructive notice of the inscription indicating that the lot in question was subject to a parking
servitude. 'There can be no question as to the legal sufficiency of an inscription on a plat to impose an equitable servitude on the land when the
intention to do so is manifest." Id. at 1311.

25. E.g., Exch. Nat'l. Bank of Chicago v. City of Des Plaines, 32 Ill.
App.
3d 722, 336 N.E.2d 8 (1975). Here, an owner of property was prevented from

using it for commercial purposes because of a "single-family dwelling" restriction created by a subdivision plat recorded in 1938. In its holding, the
court stated: "Once the plat with restrictions is recorded, every subsequent
lot purchaser has constructive notice of the restriction. Thus lot owners
may enforce the restrictions against any other lot owner." Id. at 732, 336
N.E.2d at 15.
26. See Leverton v. Laird, 190 N.W.2d 427 (Iowa 1971).
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rating the declaration. 27 However, there is a substantial body of
law to the effect that the declaration referred to in the plat, in
and of itself imparts constructive notice. 28 Of course, some argument can be made that the restrictions do not spring into being
until the subdivider signs the first deed, for until that time, he
owns all the land and cannot have any rights as against himself.29 That objection, however, has little consequence since all

the litigation occurs after that deed has been recorded. Still, it is
worthwhile to look at that first deed. The plat and declaration
cover all the land in the subdivision. Therefore, when the first
deed is executed, it has a double effect. The land sold is
restricted, but all the land retained by the subdivider is also
restricted.
Land use restrictions can still be effective even though the
declarationof restrictionsis recorded after the plat of the subdivision. In these cases, the plat itself is devoid of any reference to
building restrictions. Later, when the subdivider becomes aware
of this oversight, he records a declarationof restrictions.If the
first deeds by the subdivider refer to the declaration, there is no
problem. The declaration is incorporated into the deed by reference. But if the deeds make no such reference, a problem is
present. According to one view, the declaration is without legal
effect until the deeds breathe life into it.30 The contrary view
treats the declaration as a recordable muniment of title incorporated into the deeds even in the absence of reference thereto in

REAL ESTATE LAw § 603 (6th ed. 1974).
28. Spencer v. Poole, 207 Ga. 155, 60 S.E.2d 371 (1950) (defendant was
put on notice where a deed refers, on its face, to a map or plat that is recorded, and the plat listed the restrictions); Davis v. Hugenor, 408 Ill. 468, 97
N.E.2d 295 (1951); Kosel v. Stone, 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965) (the
filing of a subdivision plat which referred to the declaration of restrictions
constituted constructive notice of the content to subsequent purchasers);
Strickland v. Overman, 11 N.C. App. 427, 181 S.E.2d 136 (1971) (defendant
unable to place a mobile home where the deed recited that the property was
subject to all restrictive covenants of record).
29. Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972). Homeowners sought an injunction and declaratory relief for enforcement of certain restrictions and protective covenants limiting a tract housing
development to single family dwellings for residential use. The court held
that where the first conveyance from a subdivider to the first grantee (defendant's predecessor in title) clearly recited that it was subject to restrictions of record, at that point the servitude comes into existence, and the fact
that there is no reference to the restriction in the defendant's deed does not
operate to extinguish the restriction. See also Moss Dev. Co. v. Geary, 41
Cal. App. 3d 1, 115 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1974) (restrictions do not spring into existence until the first lot in the development is sold).
30. Smith v. Rasqui, 176 Cal. App. 2d 514, 1 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1959) (a plan
of restrictions does not become binding and enforceable unless those restrictions are stated in the deeds of conveyance to the purchasers).

27. R. KRATOviL,
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the deeds. 3 1 In any event, a brief reference in the deed will suffice.

32

General Plan-Deeds
At times, a general plan of building restrictions is created by

deeds. This is the oldest method; moreover, it is the worst
method. The most obvious problem relates, as one might expect,
to the inclusion of restrictions in some deeds but their omission
in others. 33 This problem becomes impossible of solution when
the language of the deed is ineptly drawn, as is usually the case
when this clumsy, antiquated method is used. For example, take
the situation where the subdivider uses a printed form containing such language as: "The above described lot is subject to the
following restrictions." Instantly, the problem becomes apparent. No intent to bind the other lots retained by the subdivider is
evident; only when all the lots are conveyed does the general
plan become apparent. Certainly, before all the lots in the subdivision have been sold, the existence of the scheme is not disclosed in the instruments of conveyance made by the common
grantor. In some jurisdictions, this is fatal to the existence of a
general plan. 34 In other jurisdictions, the intent to establish a

common scheme shown by any relevant evidence may suffice to
create a general plan. 35 Such evidence as exhibiting a map or

blueprint in the subdivider's sales office may do.36 An oral representation that all lots will be conveyed by deeds having identical covenants may suffice. 37 Likewise, a showing that a tacit
31. Stewart Transfer Co. v. Ashe, 269 Md. 74, 304 A.2d 788 (1973); Kosel v.
Stone, 146 Mont. 218, 404 P.2d 894 (1965).
32. Seaton v. Clifford, 24 Cal. App. 3d 46, 100 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1972); Davis
v. Huguenor, 408 Ill. 468, 97 N.E.2d 295 (1951) (subject to restrictions of record).
33. This problem is dealt with at some length in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1364
(1949).
34. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting the Use of
Land, 55 MmN. L. REV. 167, 199 (1970).

35. Id. at 198.
36. Utujian v. Boldt, 242 Mich. 331, 218 N.W. 692 (1928) (before the sale to

the plaintiffs, the defendants furnished them with a blueprint of the pro-

posed plat, showing the size of the lots, and the sale was made with refer-

ence to this blueprint; but the claim of the plaintiffs that during the
negotiations the defendants promised that no lots less than one acre in size
would be sold was disputed so the court refused to grant an injunction

against the defendants' sale of such lots).
37. McComb v. Hanley, 128 N.J. Eq. 316, 16 A.2d 74 (1940), rev'd 132 N.J.

Eq. 182, 26 A.2d 891 (1942) (oral representation by the common grantor who
mapped, planned, and sold the lots that such lots would be conveyed subject to like covenants for the common benefit of all subsequent grantees; on
reversal, the court said it would be a dangerous rule that purchasers of lots
may accept deeds containing a covenant or restriction imposed on the land
conveyed, limiting such covenant to the particular land described in the
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understanding existed may be enough. 38 But obviously this is
not the proper way to create interests in land. If all the lots are
ultimately conveyed out by deeds containing identical covenants, then arguably writings exist that evidence a general plan.
The fact that the deeds are not signed by the grantee, although
at times he is the party to be charged, is a hurdle the courts leap
39
lightly.
And how stands one of the early grantees? No general plan
was evident when he acquired his title. Here the courts throw up
their hands in defeat. They simply say that these early grantees
have so often been granted protection, that retreat is impossible.4° The rationale of the rule that protects prior purchasers is
not easy to find.41 Other problems remain unresolved. How
stands the grantee whose deed contained no restriction? Does
he have a right of enforcement? Is the restriction enforceable
deed, and then they or their successors in title subsequently be allowed to
come in with oral testimony tending to subvert the terms of such covenant);
Burgess v. Putnam, 464 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App 1971) (representations

made by the vendors to the purchasers of the lots in the subdivision relative
to the vendors' plan of development of the subdivision were not fraudulent

where the change in the plan of development was occasioned by the diminished real estate market; but, since such representations were material,
they nonetheless brought into existence an equitable right on the part of
the purchasers to compel the vendors to similarly restrict the use of any
remaining property).
38. Foro v. Doetsch, 66 Misc. 2d 288, 320 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1971) (based upon
inclusion bf various identical restrictions in all deeds by which grantor conveyed title to lots out of his parcel of land, his employment of a surveyor to
prepare a map showing the proposed lots and streets, and the inclusion of a
grant of a right-of-way over a proposed street in one of the deeds; grantor
could be found to have had a general plan of development for his property
and an intent to impose uniform restrictions upon all the property, held enforceable against grantor's successor in title).
39. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.25 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). The acceptance by the grantee of a deed signed by the grantor amounts to an
adoption of the signature of the grantor as that of the grantee so that the

requirement of the Statute of Frauds is considered to be satisfied.

40. E.g., Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 485, 197 N.E. 224, 228 (1935).
Though the court recognized the difficulty of finding a sound rationale for
its ruling, it nevertheless allowed an early grantee to enforce a single family
dwelling restriction against a later grantee of nearby property. This was allowed even though the restriction in the first grantee deed made no reference to the other property which was not even subdivided until twelve
years after the subdivision of the property of which the earlier grantee's
property was a part.
41. Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N.Y. 275, 288, 167 N.E. 441, 446 (1929). In
discussing the grounds for affording protection to an early grantee Justice
Cardozo said:
If we regard the restriction from the point of view of contract there is
trouble in understanding how the purchaser of lot A can gain a right to
enforce the restriction against the later purchaser of lot B without an
extraordinary extension of Lawrence v. Fox ....
Perhaps it is enough
to say the extension of the doctrine, even if illogical, has been made too
often and too consistently to permit withdrawal or retreat.
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against him?42
General Plan-ExplicitLanguage
Suppose we alter slightly the language of the subdivider's
first deed out. Suppose we let it read: "All lots in this subdivision are restricted to residential purposes." Now the deed has
served a double purpose. Not only does it restrict the lot of the
43
grantee, it also restricts all the lots retained by the subdivider.
Thus a subdivision containing 500 lots may be subjected to a
general plan of building restrictions by the subdivider's first
deed.
But the serpent remains in the garden. Is a purchaser of lot
500, whose deed contains no restrictions, required to search the
record of all other deeds by the subdivider to determine if they
contain restrictions like that quoted? One line of decisions answers the question in the negative." Note the consequences of
this doctrine. Absent a protective zoning ordinance, and they
are unknown even in large cities like Houston, one who
purchases a lot and erects a valuable dwelling may discover that
his neighbor has decided to erect a mortuary. Of course, there
are decisions to the contrary. 45 This problem seems impossible
42. Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 556 (1973); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.30
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952). Both of these sources show that courts persist in
going both ways on this question.
43. Brite v. Gray, 377 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See also 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§ 9.25 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952) (the fact that the deed is

accepted only, and not signed, is not a problem).
44. Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., Inc., 267 N.Y.
242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935), noted in 21 CORNELL L.Q. 479 (1936), reviewed by 6
SYRACUSE L. REV. 394 (1955) (a purchaser takes with notice from the record
only of incumbrance in his direct chain of title; in the absence of actual
notice before or at the time of his purchase or of other exceptional circumstances, an owner of land is only bound by restrictions if they appear in
some deed of record in the conveyance to himself or his direct predecessors
in title; to have to search each chain of title from a common grantor lest
notice be imputed would seem to negate the beneficient purposes of the
recording acts).
45. Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. St. 131, 154 A. 299 (1931) (if a deed or a contract for the conveyance of one parcel of land, with a covenant or easement
affecting another parcel of land owned by the same grantor, is duly recorded, the record is constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the
latter parcel; purchasers have a duty to read not only the description of the
property to see what was conveyed, but to read the deed in its entirety, to
note anything else which might be set forth in it; restrictions of direct predecessors can be enforced). See also Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1419 (1949); Annot.,
16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922):
The weight of authority is to the effect that if a deed or a contract for
the conveyance of one parcel of land with a covenant or easement affecting another parcel of land owned by the same grantor, if duly recorded, the record is constructive notice to the subsequent purchaser of
the latter parcel.
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of solution.46
An Implied Plan-ReciprocalNegative Easements
Although a deed contains express building restrictions referring to the land conveyed, courts have held these restrictions
applicable to the land retained by ,the grantor by resorting to the
doctrine of reciprocal negative easements. The leading case on
reciprocal negative easements is Sanborn v. McLean.47 There
the lots were sold subject to restrictions as follows: "No residence shall be erected upon said premises which shall cost less
than $2500 and nothing but residences shall be erected upon
said premises. Said residences shall front on Helene (now Collingwood) Avenue and be placed no nearer than 20 feet from the
'
street line."4
It is reasonably clear that these restrictions rest upon the
land conveyed. There is nothing to indicate that the grantor
sought to impose comparable restrictions on the land retained
by him. Nevertheless by resorting to a mouthfilling but meaningless phrase "reciprocal negative easements" '49 and on the
facts of the situation, the court in Sanborn found that the grantor had impliedly restricted the lots retained by him. There are
other cases to like effect. 50 Still other cases state that the rule
should be applied with extreme caution. 5 ' If the deed states that
the restrictions apply "only" to the lot conveyed, the doctrine
jurisdictions, the doctrine has been
cannot be applied.5 2 In other
5 3
rejected in its entirety.
Id. at 1013.
46. Outside of title insurance territory, the statement is close to being
literally true. In title insurance territory, any deed creating general plan restrictions against the entire subdivision is automatically recorded in the
company's books against the entire subdivision. Many abstracters do like-

wise.
47. 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496, 60 A.L.R. 1221 (1925).
48. Id. at 230-31 (emphasis added).

49. Id. at 229-30, where the court stated the theory of reciprocal negative

easements as follows:
If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation, sells
one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the servitude becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the owner of the lot
or lots retained can do nothing forbidden to the owner of the lot sold.
50. See, e.g., Turner v. Brocado, 206 Md. 336, 111 A.2d 855 (1955) (citing
other cases).
51. McCurdy v. Standard Realty Corp., 295 Ky. 587, 175 S.W.2d 28 (1943);
Land Developers Inc. v. Maxwell, 537 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1976); Saccomanno
v. Farb, 492 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
52. McComb v. Hanley, 132 NJ. Eq. 182, 26 A.2d 891 (1942).
53. Price v. Anderson, 358 Pa. 209, 56 A.2d 215, 2 A.L.R.2d 593 (1948)
(when a grantor imposes restrictions on parts of a tract which he sells, this
raises no inference that he means thereby to restrict the remainder of his
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It is difficult to muster much enthusiasm for a doctrine
whose advocates feel it should be applied with extreme caution.

Conceding that a judge who endeavors to rescue an incompetent
lawyer is engaged in a praiseworthy task, there are limits to
what a kind-hearted judge can do. He may find it difficult to
ascribe an intention to a draftsman who never gave the matter
any thought. The explanations of the doctrine simply fail to explain convincingly.5 4 Moreover, there is a fatal objection to
Sanborn, namely, the problem of notice.
Since there were literally no recorded documents in the
Sanborn case that would impart constructive notice of the exist-

ence of a general plan, the court was driven to the expedient of
holding that McLean had notice from the uniform character of
the residences in the development. This, of course, is sheer nonsense, and the fact that a few other courts have gone down this
trail does not make it any less so. 5 5 There are other cases holding to the contrary. 56 This country has hundreds of thousands of
acres improved by buildings virtually identical. These are com-

monly referred to as tract developments. They owe their existence to the universally recognized fact that this is the least
expensive way to build houses. The foundation crews go in at

the same time; the masons, the electricians, and the plumbers
do likewise. If this practice puts us on notice of a general plan of
building restrictions, we are all doomed to spend the rest of our
lives looking for such restrictions in the recorder's office.

property in the absence of evidence reflecting a definite purpose to bind the
remaining land, and such purpose is clearly made known to the grantees);
see also Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Reflecting the Use of Land,
55 MINN. L. REV. 167, 202 (1970).

54. See 2

AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY

§ 9.33 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952)

(where an explanation of the doctrine of reciprocal negative easements is
given under an alternative name for the doctrine, implied reciprocal servitudes).
55. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1364, 1371 (1949).
56. Dick v. Goldberg, 295 Ill. 86, 128 N.E. 723 (1920) (where the evidence
showed the party in question was aware of the following: the general appearance of the locality, the character of the houses in the locality, their
location in respect to the street, the use of the houses and character of the
neighborhood as residential; still it was held that the party did not have
notice of the existence of any restrictions); Weber v. Les Petite Academies,
548 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. 1976) (notice sufficient to charge a purchaser with
knowledge of restrictions imposed as a part of a general plan may be either
actual or constructive, including knowledge of facts which ought to have put
him on inquiry; whether the appearance of the subdivision was such as to
bring it within the notice requirement rule is a question of fact; here the
defendants could reasonably believe their lot was not a part of any uniform
scheme).
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CONCLUSION

This area of private land use restrictions is a smokescreen
laid by all the terms and theories used by the courts and text
57
writers beclouding what is essentially a simple problem.
Speaking of one troublesome aspect of the problem, it has been
said that the best solution is to recognize the problem of enforcing these restrictions as being sui generis and not based upon
any established legal theory. 58 Much confusion would be
avoided if the courts would recognize that they are dealing with
something which is sui generis. Currently, courts in the same
jurisdiction shift from contracts theory to equitable servitudes
desirable retheory and vice versa in order to reach a just and
59
case.
particular
the
in
facts
the
sult according to
The tenor of this article must have suggested to all readers
the inevitable conclusion. General plan restrictions can be sensibly created by putting into the recorded plat of a subdivision a
clear reference to a recorded declarationof restrictionsand by
including a uniform reference to such restrictions in the first
deed to each lot conveyed by the subdivider. The rights created
should be explicitly declared to be equitable servitudes enforceable by injunction. Simple, easy and legal. Why not use it?

57. Berger, A PolicyAnalysis of Promise Respecting the Use of Land, 55
MINN. L. REV. 167, 203 (1970).
58. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.30 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).

59. E.g., Remitong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461 (Wyo. 1978); see Kelly, Real

Property-RestrictiveCovenants- Effect of Expiration of Time Limitation
in Deed Under GeneralPlan,56 MICH. L. REV. 1363 (1958) (discussing Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 232 S.C. 148, 101 S.E.2d 250 (1957)).

